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LABOR ARBITRATION

LABOR ARBITRATION
I
CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES IN THE ARBITRATION OF
CLASSIFICATION GRIEVANCES
Albert B. Tarbutton, Jr.*
CINCE classification grievances arise from a disagreement in
the administering of a job classification or job evaluation
plan, an explanation of just what is a job classification plan should
be made before we discuss the principles which have been determined through arbitration of these grievances.
The purpose of a job classification plan is to establish an equitable rate structure which shall insure fair compensation for the
employees for work performed, and shall also insure a fair day's
work to the company for the money expended. To accomplish this
purpose, it is necessary that the various jobs be described. For
the job to be properly described, the job description shall include:
the department to which the job belongs; the job title; the primary
function of the job; the tools and equipment used; the materials
handled; source of supervision; direction exercised; and the employees working procedure.
After the job has been described, it is then possible to classify
or evaluate it. The classification of the job may be accomplished
by using one of several methods, which are usually distinguished
as being either a ranking method; or a classification method; or
a point rating method; or a factor comparison method.
The method with which I am most familiar is that used in the
steel industry. This method was worked out by engineers from
United States Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers of
America. It is a point plan method, and was adopted in 1947, and
is now universally used in "basic steel."
In using this method, twelve basic factors are considered and
given a numerical value. These factors are: (1) preemployment
*Attorney, Lone Star Steel Company, Daingerfield, Texas.
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training; (2) employment training and experience; (3) mental
skill; (4) manual skill; (5) responsibility for materials; (6)
responsibility for tools and equipment; (7) responsibility for
,operations; (8) responsibility for safety of others; (9) mental
effort; (10) physical effort; (11) surroundings; (12) hazards.
Each described job is considered in the light of these factors,
a value given each factor, and a total numerical value established
for that job. This numerical value placed upon the described job,
determines the rate of pay for that job, and the numerical values
run from job class one through job class thirty.
Regardless of the type of job classification plan an employer
may have in effect, he is likely to run into some difficulties in the
day-to-day operation of it, particularly if the employees are represented by a union.
In the remainder of this discussion, an attempt will be made
to set out what may be the controlling principles in the arbitration
of grievances that arise in administering a job classification plan.
It should be noted that in general, labor arbitrators have been
reluctant to agree that prior arbitration awards have authoritative
force. However, it must be admitted, that in a particular labor
dispute the reasoning and opinions of the other arbitrators, who
have dealt with a problem where the facts are similar and the
contractual provisions are also similar, do have persuasive force.
The arbitration awards from which I have selected these principles
appear to me to be controlling.
With that in mind, I should like to discuss as the first problem:
what right does management have to create new jobs and job
descriptions and to change existing jobs and job descriptions?
Unless the contract states specifically that the existing and agreed
upon job descriptions are to continue in effect as agreed upon,
and are not to be changed without the mutual consent of the
parties, arbitrators will uphold the right of management to unilaterally establish new job descriptions or change existing ones.'
This may be true even in those instances where the job descriptions and their classification were negotiated originally and have
become a part of the contractual relationship between the parties
1 Diemolding Corp., 2 Lab. Arb. 274 (1945).
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by a clause in the contract which usually reads as follows: "Rates
of pay, in the respective classification, shall be set forth on Exhibit
A which is hereto attached, and by this reference, made a part
hereof." If such is true, certainly this right of unilateral action
of making a change, is subject to the grievance procedure to establish appropriate rates for the changed jobs or new jobs.
I am basing my judgment of the above statement's being true
upon an award rendered for the Dow Chemical Company2 in which
the arbitrator states what may be the controlling principle when
he wrote the following: "I cannot hold that because the parties
have agreed upon certain job titles, descriptions and rates applicable thereto, that the company does not have an entirely free
hand to introduce new jobs and new descriptions or to take apart
existing jobs and to establish different jobs and job descriptions,
subject however, to appropriate rates as determined by grievance
procedure, and if necessary by arbitration."
This right to question the unilateral action of management in
creating new jobs or changing existing ones through arbitration
exists even though the contract provides that management may by
unilateral action change existing jobs and create new ones.8
4 an arbitrator
In the case of Republic Steel Corporation,
was
called upon to interpret a contract clause which read as follows:
"The job description and classification for each job in effect as
of the date of this agremeent, and of those hereafter agreed upon,
shall continue in effect unless management changes the job content
to the extent of one full job class or more." The arbitrator in commenting upon this clause stated that on first consideration of this
clause, he was of the impression that the right of management to
change a job content was unqualified. However, after further consideration, he now understood the clause to give management
alone the right to change the job only if the employees receive
a wage advantage of at least one job class in return. If the employees do not receive a wage advantage, mutual agreement to
make the change is required.
This clause appears in most steel contracts, and in Lone Star
2

Dow Chemical Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 336 (1954).

3 Emhart Manufacturing Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 61 (1954).
4 11 Lab. Arb. 698 (1948).
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Steel Company5 the arbitrator held that a change in job content
either up or down one full job class would permit the company
to reclassify the job without the mutual consent of the union. Of
course, if the union does not agree with the classification, it may
file a grievance.
Up to this point, only the right of management to change or
create new jobs has been discussed. The difficult question arises
in those instances where management attempts by unilateral action
to eliminate a job classification. This usually arises when management combines the duties of two jobs into one job and gives it a
new title; and there exists in the contract a clause similar to the
one first mentioned, which ties in the classifications and rates by
reference. Such a situation often develops when a technological
change is made, and a part of the job duties are done away with
due to this change.
The weight of authority holds that management cannot unilaterally eliminate a classification. Arbitrator Whitley P. McCoy discussed this question in Esso Standard Oil Company.6 In that case,
the identical clause as first quoted above was in the contract, i.e.,
"Rates of pay, in the respective classification, shall be set forth
on Exhibit A which is hereto attached, and by this reference,
made a part hereof." The "Exhibit A" mentioned was headed
"Wage Rates," and consisted of 37 pages in two columns, the
first column containing the wage rate, and the second column
containing the classification. Among the classifications listed was
that of "Welder 1st Class" with the rate of $2.60 opposite. On
the same page appeared the classification "Burner 1st Class" with
the rate $2.245 opposite.
The company decided, and notified the union, that it would
add the burning duties to the welder classification, giving the
burners the option of becoming welders at the higher rate. Those
burners not becoming welders were "red circled," which means
that a man holding that job now will continue to hold it, but as
those jobs become vacant, they will not be refilled. The company
was in the process of abolishing the job by not filling vacancies.
Mr. McCoy had this to say: "The question here is not the same

523 Lab. Arb.

164 (1954).
69 Lab. Arb. 569 (1952).
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question as the right of the company to abolish jobs, create jobs,
or combine jobs. Jobs must be distinguished from classifications.
Combining the duties of classifications recognized in the contract
is a different thing from combining the duties or job content of
various jobs or abolishing jobs.
"The contract does not expressly freeze the classification but the
weight of arbitration authority is to the effect that such contract
provisions do evidence an intent to agree upon the classifications
as well as the rates. If a fair interpretation of the contract provision quoted above, together with Exhibit A, which is a part of
that contract, freeze the classifications as well as the rates, then
the company was in violation of the contract in adding the duties
of the Burner classification to the duties of welder."
This case is important for it shows that management cannot
gradually eliminate a classification, even in case the action taken
does not create a hardship upon any employee. The case is also
interesting for the explanation given by Mr. McCoy in distinguishing the Esso case from that of one decided by him for International Harvester Company.
The attorneys for Esso Corporation called to the attention of
Mr. McCoy in their brief, that in case decided by him,7 he had
upheld management in unilaterally changing a job in the classification of Drill Press Operator.
Mr. McCoy explained that in the International Harvester case
he was speaking of jobs and not classifications. He pointed out
that the question was not whether the company could add the
duties of some other existing classification to those of a Drill
Press Operator, but whether the company could change the various piece work jobs belonging within the classification of Drill
Press Operator. He pointed out that decisions relating to jobs
within a classification are not in point.
This same principle as stated in the Esso case was stated by
arbitrator Doyle in Nebraska Consolidated Mills Company, Inc.,
wherein he said, "The prerogatives of management do not include
the right to obliterate classification boundaries."
The best summation of management's rights in such a situation,
7International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 414 (1949).
S 22 Lab. Arb. 785 (1954).
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and a summation with which most arbitrators will probably agree,
is that given by arbitrator Harold M. Gilden in Lone Star Steel
Company. He says, "Certainly the existence of a job description
and classification in the plant's rate structure provides no assurance that such character of work will always be available. If,
through the introduction of improved manufacturing processes
or advanced techniques, a given category of work disappears, it
would be futile to argue that the company nevertheless is obligated
to retain employees in that classification. The decision to abolish
specific jobs properly rests with the company, and if the same is
dictated by sound operating practices and is free from arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory taint, there is no room for censure.
So too, when by reason of technological advancements, job content
is so drastically altered as to reduce it to a mere shadow of its
former dimensions, the continued survival of trivial job elements
does not require the company to persist in assigning employees
to that job title. In either of these contingencies, however, the
abandoned job description and wage rate are not discarded they simply remain in a dormant state as an integral part of the
rate structure awaiting any further resumption of that type of
work."
Just how much of the job content would be considered a "mere
shadow of its former dimensions" is hard to say. Certainly, so
long as the job functions of established categories persist in significant portions, they may not be abolished through the expedient
either of merging them with other jobs, or by combining them
under a new title.
If the union will not mutually agree to the combining of the
job duties under a new classification, it appears that the only
alternative is to await contract negotiations. However, it may be
posible to successfully argue before an arbitrator that the reallocation of duties from two jobs creates a new job. Support for
such can be found in Mengel Company, Inc.9 In that case an
arbitrator held that where a contract gives the employer the right
to set a new rate when a new job is created, the employer has the
right to set a new rate when he takes certain duties from one job
9 17 Lab. Arb. 361 (1951).
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and reallocates them to another, because this reallocation of duties
creates a new job. It would have to be argued that the old classification was not eliminated but is only dormant, and is awaiting
use should management see fit to realign the duties. I do not think
such an argument would carry too much weight with a majority
of arbitrators; not because the classification is not dormant, but
because this is not a new job.
We shall turn now to a different type of classification grievance
and probably the most frequent type of grievance in the operation
of a job classification plan. That is whether a given change in job
content is substantial enough to warrant a reclassification.
There is no exact guide to help in determining whether a reclassification is called for. Arbitrators generally uphold the
union's request for re-evaluation of a job where they find that a
job requires considerably more responsibility and discretion, or
more time and effort than it did before. Arbitrator Prasow in
1" says, ". . . the test is not necesLockheed Aircraft Corporation
sarily the volume or percentage of time devoted to the performance of the new duties, but whether the services are essential to
the job rather than merely sporadic, occasional or isolated. The
principle involved is that it is improper for an employer to make
periodic and recurring use of an employee's skill which is higher
than that embodied in the existing job classification, even for a
small proportion of the employee's total time." These types of
classification grievances arise mainly when a new machine is
installed or a change is made whereby not as many employees
are needed to cover the job.
The introduction of a new type of machine on a certain job
does not necessarily call for a reclassification. However, if it results
in a "material and significant increase" in the skill and labor
required for the job then the arbitrators will usually say it should
be reclassified. 1 It is no defense to say the employee is doing the
same type of work, and there has been no limit placed on the
amount of work he will do.
Once the union has raised a question of reclassification, and it
is turned down by an arbitrator, it appears that the only recourse
10 11 Lab. Arb. 490 (1948).
11 Hershey Chocolate Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 268 (1951).
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is to bring the matter up again in contract negotiations. The arbitrator in Federal Bearing Company, Inc. 2 told the union that
there was no reason to re-evaluate a job that another arbitrator
had ruled was properly classified under a prior contract. The
union did not question the classification during negotiations, and
there had been no material change in the job since then.
In the creation of a new job, can management unilaterally
classify this job and set the rate?
This problem will arise in those cases where the contract is
silent concerning the creation of a new job. Arbitrators are uniform in holding that management does not have the right to unilaterally classify or evaluate a job under the management right's
clause; that the union, as the bargaining agent, has the right to
negotiate upon the wages that will be paid an employee in the
bargaining unit, and this right includes the rate to be paid for
a new job.'"
This same principle applies in the case of a change in the workload of a job that has been previously classified. 4
A point that may be of interest, and should be mentioned while
on this topic, is the question of whether management must permit
a union analyst on job classifications to conduct on the job studies.
The U. S. Court of Appeals in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Otis Elevator Company' held that collective bargaining provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act
required an employer to make available to a union the time study
data in the possesion of the employer used in setting up work
standards. It further held that these statutory provisons did not
impose a duty upon the employer to open its plant to union representatives to enable them to make new time studies for the purpose
of obtaining data on which to formulate new standards.
The employer, relying upon this case, refused to allow the
union's analyst to study a disputed job which was pending a hearing as a classification grievance. The union filed a refusal to bar12 22 Lab. Arb. 721 (1954).
is Linde Air Products, 2 Lab. Arb. 223 (1946) ; Wetter Numbering Machine Co., 13
Lab. Arb. (1949) ; Crossett Lumber Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 544 (1950) ; Virginia and Carolina Chemical Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 228 (1954).
14 Wheeler Insulated Wire, 23 Lab. Arb. 782 (1955).
15208 F. 2d 176 (1953).
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gain complaint and the National Labor Relations Board trial
examiner, whose findings are pending review by the board, found
that the company violated the Act. The trial examiner distinguished this case from the circuit court case in that the information sought in the earlier case was not related to a particular
grievance, whereas in this case it was. In the examiner's opinion,
the company had refused to bargain collectively.
A question that may arise at various times is whether an employee can be downgraded. Occasionally an employee is paid at
the rate of a higher classification than he is actually working.
Most arbitrators are likely to permit the downgrading if it is
clear that the employee actually belongs in a lower classification.
However, if the company delays an unreasonable length of time
after discovering the error, the arbitrator may not allow the downgrading. 6 In the case of National Tube Company 7 an arbitrator
decided that six years was too long a period to wait before correcting a classification error. He pointed out that the wrong classification had continued for several years as a direct result of
the failure of management representatives to discover and correct
the error earlier. The arbitrator agreed with the company that it
had the right to correct its mistakes, but said that management
had more than reasonable opportunities in the past to make
adjustments.
What right does management have to assign employees work
outside their job classification?
When the contract establishes job classifications, arbitrators generally hold employers to the observance of classification lines in the
assignment of work.'" Exceptions to this rule have been permitted,
however, in case of emergencies, 9 or when the assignment outside a classification was only temporary."0 It has been held that an
assignment for less than a week would be considered a tempo16 Carnegie Illinois Steel Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 5 (1951) ; Erie Forge and Steel Co., 22
Lab. Arb. 551 (1954).
17 7 Lab. Arb. 575 (1945).
18 Chrysler Corp., 14 Lab. Arb. 163 (1950) ; Sayles Biltmore Bleachers Inc., 17 Lab.
Arb. 451 (1951).
19 Caterpillar Tractor Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 802 (1952).
20 Dayton Maleable Iron Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 666 (1951); Neville Chemical Co., 22
Lab. Arb. 358 (1954).
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rary assignment. 1 One arbitrator, however, while upholding the
right of an employer to use employees in one classification on
work in another classification temporarily, nevertheless told the
employer that it was bad labor relations to do so without consulting the union.22
CONCLUSION

In summarizing the foregoing, the controlling principles in the
arbitration of classification grievances appear to be: that unless
the contract prevents such, there is nothing to prevent an employer
from establishing new classifications or changing old ones; that
if the classification plan is tied into the contractual relationship,
the employer can change the job content, abolish jobs, and create
new jobs, subject to the grievance procedure. However, he cannot
eliminate a job classification without mutual consent of the union,
and when changes in job content are made, a reclassification of
the job will be allowed by most arbitrators if a reclassification is
requested. In the installation of a new job, the employer must
bargain with the union on the rate to be paid; and, except in
cases of emergency or temporary change, arbitrators hold that
an employee shall work only in his classification.
II
CRITERIA FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF WAGE DISPUTES
Chris Dixie*
RBITRATION has not been necessary for the settlement of
Jwage
disputes in most of American industry and during
most American history. However, in certain industries, especially
utilities and others affected with a public interest, and at some
times, especially in war and during sharp economic fluctuation,
arbitration of wages has been found preferable to work stoppage.
21
22

Huntington Chair Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 581 (1954).
Bethlehem Steel Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 113 (1947).
* Attorney, Dixie & Ryan, Houston, Texas.
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In this article, the merits and demerits of various criteria used
in the trial and decision of wage arbitration cases are not discussed. Instead, this is a brief survey to identify and explain the
various factors which have been in fact prominent or instrumental
in the shaping of arbitration awards.
Fortunately for this purpose there has recently been published
a work by Irving Bernstein entitled The Arbitration of Wagest
-an excellent monograph which not only analyzes the historical
merit of wage arbitration but also collates on a statistical basis
a substantial group of arbitration awards which have been handed
down in this country.
Since this paper is primarily a book review of Mr. Bernstein's
work, it ought to be recognized as such. And I wish to add that
any person interested in taking any practical steps with reference
to wage arbitration will not want to overlook close review of
this volume.
Mr. Bernstein compiled his figures by extracting from the first
fourteen volumes of the Labor Arbitration Reports every case
pertaining to wage arbitration-209 in number. The period of
time covered is from V-J Day to the Korean War (1945 to 1950),
a period of substantial economic fluctuation with an abundant
sampling of both wartime and peacetime conditions. From the
209 awards considered he designed an inventory of contentions
and rulings something in the nature of a box score which reflects
how various arguments have been received in these cases.
In the beginning, it should be noted that the submission agreement is the all important document. It may fix and determine the
criteria and therefore the course of a wage arbitration, or it may
permit the litigation to roll over a very wide area of miscellaneous
economic argument.
In addition, the submission agreement, if tightly drawn, can
profitably confine the arbitrator to a consideration of the difference between the parties. For example, if good faith and serious
negotiations have resulted in a last offer by the union of a fifteen
t BERNSTEIN, IRVING, THE ARBITRATION OF WAGES, University of California Press,
Berkeley, California (1954).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

cent increase and a last offer by the employer of ten cents, the
arbitrator may well be confined to the five cent difference in his
award.

Turning now to the factors which have most often been cited
by the parties and relied upon by the arbitrator, we find that far
and away the most prominent factor has been that of comparison.
This includes comparison of wage levels or wage changes in
other firms in the same industry, other industry, other plants of
the same company, other locals of the same union or other unions
in the same or similar jurisdiction.
Comparisons of wages with other firms in the same industry
account for fully 50% of the arbitrator's decisions. Another 10%
of the cases have been decided by comparison between industries.
Therefore, in a total of 60% of the cases the comparison factor has
been the decisive element. It has overcome a great variety of
contrary arguments and seems to be regarded by the arbitrators
as the most reliable and sensible of all tests.
It is easy to make strong arguments against such predominance
of this factor. As a practical matter, however, it ought to be
acknowledged that the arbitrators are doing no more than reflecting the importance which has been voluntarily accorded to this
subject by industry and labor at the bargaining table for a good
many years. No one familiar with labor relations will deny the
close, sometimes microscopic, attention that both sides have given
to inter-industry and intra-industry comparisons. In some quarters it has become fashionable to go so far as to entertain wage
inequity arbitrations, that is, to allow regular arbitration of a
union's claim that a given job or jobs is not at a par with the
wage paid by selected competitors for the same or similar job.
II
The second most prominent factor in the decisions has been the
cost of living, i.e., a movement up or down in some selected index
of consumer prices. This argument has been advanced by the
union in 27% of the cases and by the employer in 8% of the
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cases. It has been adopted as the primary basis for decision by
the arbitrators in about 35% of the cases. In a very rough way
it may be said therefor that cost of living has become a prominent factor in the arbitrators' minds practically every time the
subject has been raised by either side.
Here again it is fair to say that the arbitrators are reflecting
the facts of life at the bargaining table. The decisions reflect a
few scattered attacks on the various systems of determining consumer prices, but these arguments have made little or no headway.
III
The next factor of prominence in the field of wage arbitration
is the matter of financial condition of the employer i.e. the firm's
ability to pay, inability to pay, or its competitive position, price
and otherwise. The importance of this factor, however, is mostly
in the fact that it has been urged by employers in 32% of the
cases. Unions have tendered it in only 3% of the cases. It has
been adopted by the arbitrators in only 4% of the cases as the
decisive factor, which is strongly suggestive that the employers'
argument on this score has not heavily prevailed at least in this
sampling of cases which is weighted with utility cases. Arbitrators
have almost always recognized this factor as one of weight, but
they have seldom been willing to accept it as a permanent depressant on wages of sufficient weight to overcome all other facts
in the case. Especially in the public utility cases, the reasoning
seems well worked out that the question of a proper wage settlement must not be controlled by ability to pay because the arbitrator may not assume that the utility regulatory body will not do the
fair and proper thing on rates.
The above three criteria are the only really frequent factors
in the reported cases. From here on, there is miscellany of arguments which may be quite pertinent indeed to the specific case
but which have actually been selected as the decisive factor in
less than 3% of the cases.
IV
Differential features of the work have been considered. These
include special conditions of employment such as skill, physical
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strain, availability of overtime, the attractiveness of fringe benefits, etc. Employers particularly have urged this argument in about
11% of the cases, but arbitrators have accepted it in only 1%.
V
The argument of substandards is made. The claim is that the
existing wage rates are below a proper standard of living and
should be raised to approach or reach some established budget
level. Unions have urged it 9% of the time but arbitrators have
accepted it only 2%.
VI
The factor of productivity involves the argument that output
per man hour has risen or declined within the firm or the industry. Although this factor has received trivial weight up to now,
it is my opinion that it is one which is becoming more and more
prominent at the bargaining table and one which will inevitably
be reflected in arbitrators' awards as time passes. In 1948, the
General Motors-UAW Agreement incorporated the idea of a 2%
annual improvement factor. This 2% is a fuzzy figure which has
been arrived by some economists from incomplete and fragmentary data as the national average of improvement in all industries
from year to year. Productivity has also come into special consideration in the growing variety of incentive plans adopted by
large segments of American industry. Above the standard pay
for a "fair day's work" many employers have been willing to
pay to their employees a participating share in extra production
resulting from special effort. As this practice increases, it seems
almost a certainty that the future will see more emphasis on the
idea of productivity in the arbitration awards, especially where
incentive programs do not exist.
Productivity increase however, is a combination of gradually
increasing skill on the one hand and modernization and improvement of equipment on the other. The subject becomes easily embroiled in many serious arguments that push in opposite directions. The workers, of course, want higher wages, but on the other
hand consumers are entitled to expect lower prices from our tech-
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nological progress. Management expects higher salaries and last
but not least, the investors in this new equipment want higher
dividends. No doubt productivity is just as difficult to apply as
it is easy to recognize as a factor.
VII
Hours of work is a factor. This involves the regularity of employment or the length of the work week. In the construction industry particularly, the unions have argued that special consideration must be given to the fact that employment is irregular
and greatly affected by weather conditions. Employers have occasionally brought forward the argument that weight should be
given to the fact that they maintain the practice of giving the
employees regular overtime work. Neither argument has scored
very often.
VIII
General economic considerations include the argument that a
particular wage adjustment, up or down, would have a favorable
or unfavorable effect upon the economy as a whole. Undoubtedly,
statesmanlike, this consideration has seldom been able to penetrate into the practical affairs of men bargaining wages and of
arbitrators dealing with cases one at a time.
Ix
The union behavior argument is that the union strike record
is good or bad and should be rewarded or penalized. This argument has made little progress.
X
Manpower attraction is the argument that existing wage rates
are high enough to recruit the necessary labor supply, hence, no
increase is warranted. This has been largely ignored.
CONCLUSION

In brief summary therefore the record appears to be that parties who submit wages to arbitration are more apt to deal with
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the relevant and the weighty if they concentrate on comparisons
and cost of living. In my opinion, we will hear more in the future
from the productivity argument. The other factors listed are of
limited and special application to unique situations, few and far
between, and have not had serious effect on the main current on
wage arbitration.
I will add this one observation: arbitration of wages has been
widely suspected as an impractical excursion into abstract ideas
of justice and economics unrelated to the hard facts of business
life. However the record is substantially otherwise. If one phrase
will describe the results so far, it is that wage arbitration awards
tend to reflect faithfully the wage picture at the bargaining table.
III
THE ARBITRATION OF DISCHARGE CASES
Guy L. Horton*
PREPARATION BY COUNSEL

A

a preliminary to this subject, it should be observed that the
respective rights of the parties as well as the jurisdiction
of the arbitrator may vary according to the language of the particular contract. The most common provision in regard to discharge in contracts in this area is the "just cause" provision. This
reserves to management the right to discharge for just cause and
extends to the employee the protection that he will not be discharged except for good cause. In view of these corresponding
rights and the fact that discharge is recognized as the extreme
industrial penalty, it is only natural that discharges are the frequent cause of arbitration.
The joint authors of one book on the subject of labor arbitration' make the observation that perhaps the greatest single cause
of disputes is the imposition of discipline such as discharge or
* Attorney and Arbitrator, Stillwater, Oklahoma.
1UPDEGRAFF AND

McCoy,

ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES,

131 (1946).

1955]

LABOR ARBITRATION

layoff. However, in a study of ten years of grievance arbitration
between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the United Steel
Workers of America by the United States Department of Labor,
completed in 1954, which involved a total of 1003 grievances,
only 89 involved discipline. Perhaps there has been a gradual
reduction in this type of dispute, but they are by no means infrequent, and are probably the most hotly contested type of labormanagement dispute.
Discharge cases almost invariably involve a disputed question
of fact, and it necessarily follows that preparation by counsel is
largely confined to assembling the facts in the case. This involves
interviewing those persons who have knowledge of the circumstances causing the discharge. It is only by interviewing such
persons that counsel for the parties obtain a proper understanding
of the issue.
Often counsel is not engaged until the case has been taken to
arbitration, and due to the time consumed by the preliminary steps
of the grievance procedure, he may not have the opportunity to
interview witnesses until some time following the discharge. However, as in any type of investigation, it is important for witnesses
to be interviewed as soon as possible. Written statements should
be taken from the witnesses while the facts are fresh in their
minds. An honest witness may be afflicted by a poor memory. For
that reason a wise counsel never depends on a witness testifying
in exact conformity with his initial statements. He will have a
final interview with his witnesses just prior to the hearing.
While, doubtless, there is a division of opinion on the subject,
most arbitrators are ordinary human beings with normal reactions.
It is therefore advisable in the final interview with witnesses to
discuss with them the importance of their demeanor while testifying. It should be emphasized to them that the rights of the party
who calls them depend to a great extent upon their ability to relate
fairly and intelligently the facts as they understand them.
If plant rules are involved, counsel should advise himself of
the same, the date and manner of their publication, and whether
under like circumstances they have been enforced. This may
enable him to prove or disprove discrimination concerning the
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record of the employee, and this may prove important to the case.
The discharge may be based on the charge of negligence or
incompetence in regard to the performance of the employee's
duties, and this may involve a mechanical or chemical process concerning which counsel and, incidentally, the arbitrator has little or
no understanding. In this type of case it is essential that the advocate seek the assistance of those who understand such operations so
that he may know bow to develop the facts and present them as
clearly as possible to the arbitrator.
Most collective bargaining agreements contain language which
provides, in substance, that upon reinstatement of a discharged
employee he shall be made whole for wages lost. Some arbitrators
are of the opinion that under such a provision earnings by the employee subsequent to the discharge are not deductible, but it
appears that the majority believe otherwise. For this reason counsel for both company and union should be able to establish the
amount of earnings of the discharged employee subsequent to the
discharge. The company does not imply a weakness in its case
by introducing evidence of this nature. As in other fields of law
careful preparation is vitally important and is usually a necessary
precedent to a convincing presentation.
BURDEN OF PROOF

Ordinarily in the arbitration of labor disputes there is no
burden of proof resting on either party. But in regard to discharge
cases there appears to have emerged the rule that the burden of
proof rests upon the company to establish the commission of the
offense by some quantum of required proof.2
There is authority for the view that when the company has established the commission of the offense, the burden of proof shifts
to the union to show that the penalty of discharge is too severe
for the act committed. 8 There is a variety of opinion as to the
quantum of proof necessary to sustain a discharge. It has been
2 Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 254 (1945)
Casing Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 179 (1950) ; Bell Aircraft Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 448
and Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 108 (1948) ; American Smelting and Refining, 7
(1947) ; Carolina Coach Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 451 (1953).
3 Swift and Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 108 (1948) ; Carolina Coach Co., 20
(1953).

; Armen-Berry
(1953) ; Swift
Lab. Arb. 147
Lab. Arb. 451
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held to be by "a fair preponderance of the evidence,' "decisive
factual proof,"'5 "clear and convincing evidence," 6 "evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable mind of guilt," 7 and "beyond a
reasonable doubt."'
There is also authority to the effect that an arbitrator may require a higher degree of proof in one case than in another.9 One
author has made the statement that if the agreement contains a
specific requirement of "just cause," a higher degree of proof
may be required than otherwise would be the case.'0 The same author states that in the final analysis it would appear that the degree
of proof required will depend upon the individual arbitrator's
view of the seriousness of the charge, the equities reflected by the
circumstances of the case, and the discharge clause of the collective bargaining agreement. There is no doubt that the question
of burden of proof as well as quantum of proof may depend on
the provisions of the contract, and most likely this accounts at
least in part for the divergent views on the subject as stated in
awards.
It is the opinion of the writer that the majority of arbitrators
take the view that under a "just cause" type of agreement the
burden of proof is on the company to prove that the discharged
employee committed the act for which he was discharged by a fair
preponderance of the evidence. It is also believed that when guilt
is established or admitted a like burden of proof is on the union
to show that the penalty of discharge is too severe for the act
committed.
PROCEDURE

When the arbitration hearing has convened, it is customary for
the parties to first furnish the arbitrator with a list of appearances. If there is not a submission agreement, the parties should
4 Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 254 (1945).

5American Liberty Oil Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 399 (1946).
6 Aviation Maintenance Corp., 8 Lab. Arb. 261 (1947).
7 Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 160 (1945).
8 A. S. Beck Shoe Corp., 2 Lab. Arb. 212 (1944).
9American Smelting and Refining Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 147 (1947).
10 ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 167 (1952).
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furnish him with a copy of the contract so that he may be apprised
of the pertinent provisions relating to discharge.
Following this, each of the parties should make opening statements briefly outlining their respective positions in regard to the
dispute. At this point there is sometimes injected the question
of which party has the duty to proceed with the evidence. As a
general proposition, the party having the burden of proof has
the duty to proceed with the evidence, while the duty to proceed,
on the other hand, is generally considered to rest with the party
who advanced the grievance. If this question is raised, it would
appear to be a proper ruling, supported by custom, to require
the union to proceed to the extent of showing that the employee
was discharged and at least a denial by him of any known justification for discharge. The duty of proceeding with the evidence
should not be confused with the burden of proof.
There is valid criticism of the rule that the union should have
the burden of going forward in a discharge case. The union may
not know all the facts on which the company relies for the discharge. In blindly attempting to anticipate all the evidence on
which it believes the company may rely, the union may waste a
great deal of time on matters which in the end prove irrelevant to
the issue, or it may be compelled to put on its principal case in
rebuttal. It is obvious that a discharge case would require less
time and be presented with greater clarity if the company should
assume the duty to proceed. This might be opposed by the union
in the belief that it is to its advantage to open and close. It has
been suggested that arbitrators have the right to require the company to open, 1 ' but in the absence of an agreement as to procedure
the writer doubts that an arbitrator has this authority.
If the company enters a plea to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator based on some proposition such as timeliness, the jurisdictional
question should be presented at the outset of the hearing. If the
arbitrator is satisfied that he does not have jurisdiction, the plea
will be sustained and the hearing terminated. If he is in doubt,
he will reserve his ruling and proceed to hear the case on its
merits.
11 UPDEGRAFF AND

McCoY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 97.
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The procedure in regard to the introduction of testimony and
evidence is similar to that followed by courts, with the exception
that arbitration hearings are informal in nature and legal rules
of evidence are not strictly enforced. The practice of accepting
virtually anything in the way of evidence offered by either party
often shocks the lawyer without former experience in labor arbitration, and he will consume considerable time in voicing objections unless assured by the arbitrator that such evidence will be
given only such weight as it rightly deserves. In overruling objections to evidence, such as affidavits and hearsay, the arbitrator
usually advises the parties that he is accepting such only for "what
it is worth." If either party tenders evidence of "offers of compromise," the arbitrator will advise the parties that such will be
given little or no consideration, and that if the parties make a
practice of offering this type of evidence, it will destroy the
effectiveness of the grievance procedure preceding arbitration.
If parties know their offers of compromise will be so disclosed,
such naturally erects a barrier to amicable settlements which
otherwise may be reached.
After the parties have completed the introduction of evidence
they have the privilege of argument. They may agree upon the
amount of time to be used by each side or ask that such be fixed
by the arbitrator.
One or both of the parties may ask for time within which to
file post-hearing briefs. Occasionally one of the parties will object
to the filing of post-hearing briefs. The rule seems well established that either party may claim this right, and if one party
does, the other has the choice of filing a post-hearing brief or of
permitting his opponent's brief to go unanswered. The usual
arrangement in regard to the filing of briefs is for the parties to
agree that each will deposit his brief in the United States mail on
the same agreed date.
THE DECISION

Making the decision, of course, concerns the most important
and difficult part of the duties of an arbitrator. Strong rights exist
on both sides of a discharge case, and the burden of making the
decision is often a very heavy one.
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Sometimes the first and principal question is whether the discharged employee committed the alleged offense. This involves the
evaluation of the evidence and, usually, the credibility of witnesses.
In determining the weight of the evidence an arbitrator will
consider those same rules which are set forth by a court in its
instructions to a jury. Where there is an issue in the evidence
involving the credibility of witnesses, the average arbitrator will
instinctively call to his assistance the various elements contained
in a court's instructions to a jury on that subject.
It should be observed that a witness may be entirely honest
in testifying to facts he believes to be true and yet be mistaken.
A witness may be completely truthful and know the facts but
through lack of ability to express himself, appear hesitant or
uncertain and leave the impression to some that he is testifying
falsely. There is also the witness who is glib and assured, and yet
is not telling the truth.
Sometimes an arbitrator is confronted with the problem of
having two witnesses with equal appearance of credibility testifying in direct opposition to each other under circumstances that
demand the conclusion that one is unquestionably lying. It has
been the experience of this writer that the answer to which witness
is falsifying is not often found in the major points of their testimony, for such a witness has prepared himself on these, but will
be found in their testimony on minor or collateral matters.
In order to resolve the question of the credibility of witnesses
the arbitrator must depend, in the final analysis, on whatever
native ability plus whatever skill and training he may have
acquired to arrive at the truth, as must every person be he arbitrator or judge, who is placed in a similar position.
A discharge case may involve only the question of guilt, for the
offense may be of a type that, if committed, no reasonable person
would contend that discharge was not the proper penalty. Other
cases will involve the issue of whether discharge is the proper
penalty for an offense proved or admitted. Where this is the
question the abitrator must of necessity weigh the nature of the
offense against the severity of the penalty of discharge. In doing
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this he must give consideration to the rule that it is primarily
the function of management to decide upon the proper penalty
but that this does not mean that the company's discretion can
never be questioned. The company's discretion must not be abused,
but must at least be reasonably and fairly exercised.
The correct answer may be found in the company's actions in
the past in regard to similar wrongdoing, but even this principle
has its imperfections. In failing to assess the penalty of discharge
in all cases involving a particular infraction, the company may
either discriminate among employees or subject itself to such a
charge. But to hold that management must always assess the same
penalty for the same offense ignores the fact that there may be
either mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The rigid application of the same penalty for the same infraction without regard
to all the circumstances of the case is not to the best interests of
either management or the employees. The test is that of fairness
and consistency, considering the facts of the particular case.
The question of whether the penalty of discharge is appropriate
punishment cannot be generalized. As stated by one arbitrator,
what constitutes "just cause" must be decided on the basis of the
individual merits of each case.' 2
An arbitrator should remain mindful of the rights of management in regard to determining the appropriate penalty, but management, by agreeing to submit to an arbitrator the question of
whether the discharge of an employee was for "just cause," vests
in the arbitrator the right and duty to determine this question.
The proper guide for deciding the question has been stated by
arbitrator Harry H. Platt as follows:
What a reasonable man, mindful of the habits and customs of industrial life and of the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in
the community, ought to have done under similar circumstances, and
in that light to decide whether the conduct of the discharged employee
was defensible and the disciplinary penalty just.'8
The jurisdiction of the arbitrator to reduce penalties, including
that of discharge, is often the subject of dispute. While certainly
the arbitrator should not compromise his convictions and commute
12 Power Equipment Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 558 (1945).
13 Riley Stoker Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. 764 (1947).
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a discharge to suspension in a vain attempt to please both parties,
his jurisdiction to substitute an intermediate penalty under a "just
cause" contract appears to be established by a great majority of
awards. 4
In the study of ten years of grievance arbitrations between the
Bethlehem Steel Company and United Steel Workers of America,
which involves a "just cause" contract, of the 89 grievances involving discipline, 16 were granted, 15 partially granted, 54
denied and 4 dismissed as untimely.
In a study by Professor J. M. Porter, Jr., of 197 discipline
cases during the years 1946 and 1947, the discipline was mitigated in 50 per cent of those cases in which management was
not completely sustained.' 5 This lends support to those who contend arbitrators all too frequently try to take a middle course.
An experienced arbitrator will realize that while the employee
who deserved to be discharged may appreciate clemency, neither
the company nor union will be deceived and will thereafter be
hesitant to submit their rights to him for decision.
There are cases where the employee is guilty of misconduct
which merits punishment but not to the extent of discharge. Certainly under such circumstances he should neither be discharged
nor permitted to escape punishment, and an intermediate penalty
would appear to be the only proper solution.
Facts usually considered by arbitrators in connection with the
penalty of discharge are the seriousness of the offense, the past
record of the worker, plant rules, notice of the same and the past
practice of the company in regard to similar misconduct.
If the parties prefer that a discharged employee be either reinstated or his discharge confirmed, the arbitrator's jurisdiction
can be so confined by the simple expedient of adding appropriate
language to the contract, including the same in the submission
agreement, or by orally advising the arbitrator that the parties
have so agreed.
14 Klauser Cooperage Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 838 (1950) ; Gordon Pew Fisheries, 11 Lab.
Arb. 15 (1948) ; Curtis Wright Corp., 11 Lab. Arb. 139 (1948) ; Victor Industries, 11
Lab. Arb. 997 (1948); Goodyear Clearwater Mills, 12 Lab. Arb. 1 (1949); Calvine
Cotton Mills, 12 Lab. Arb. 21 (1949).
15 Porter, The Arbitrationof Industrial Disputes Arising From DisciplinaryAction,
PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH AssOCIA-

TION,

262 (1949).

